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Optimal Currency Basket Pegs for Developing and Emerging
Economies
By Joseph P. Daniels, Peter G. Toumanoff*, and Marc von der Ruhr
The exchange rate arrangement represents an important policy choice for emerging and
transitional economies as they strive to become stable and market-driven. A wide variety of
arrangements have emerged, ranging from currency boards, basket-currency pegs and
single-currency pegs to floating rates. Recently the IMF has recommended that, if the exchange
value of a currency is to be pegged, it is better to peg to a basket of currencies rather than a
single currency. Nonetheless, there has been little theoretical research on the management and
optimal design of basket-peg arrangements. In this paper we extend the small-country
macroeconomic model of Turnovsky to show that an optimally designed basket-peg
arrangement can minimize the variance in domestic consumer prices as well as the variance of
foreign reserves. The model highlights the importance of the money and bond markets and,
therefore, the importance of various interest rate channels. Additionally we show that a
trade-weighted currency basket is not only suboptimal, it is at odds with increasing capital market
integration. Further our solutions illustrate that the optimal weights will evolve as the domestic
economy integrates with the global market for goods and services, and financial instruments.

I. Introduction
In the aftermath of the 1997 and 1998 currency crises, there arose a debate on the
appropriate exchange rate arrangement for emerging and transitional economies. Some argued
that to bring stability to global markets, a flexible exchange rate system should be adopted by all,
while others pressed for fixed exchange rate arrangements. Hence, arrangements that lie
between the ends of the spectrum currency basket pegs for example-appear to have fallen out of
favor.
For emerging economies heavily dependent on exports the exchange rate is an important
nominal price, and for these economies, there is a trade-off between domestic inflation
performance and real growth that is dependent upon international price competitiveness. Frankel
(1999, p.1) counters the claims above, arguing that no single regime a panacea, but more
importantly, for an given country no regime is best for all time. Frankel maintains that
intermediate regimes, as opposed to those at the end of the spectrum, are more likely to be
appropriate for most countries. The fact remains that a large number of nations, as shown in
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Table 1, continue to manage their currency against a basket as this arrangement provides a
nominal guide for monetary policy as well as some limited flexibility against individual currencies.
The choice and management of the exchange rate arrangement typically plays an
important role in a currency crisis, especially in an emerging or transitional economy. (See Sachs
1996 for a discussion on the importance of the exchange rate regime for transition to a market
system.) Pegged- or heavily managed exchange rate arrangements result in relatively rigid
nominal exchange values among involved currencies. During the period when the dollar was
appreciating against the German mark and the Japanese yen, for example, the currencies of
East Asian nations became overvalued relative to the currencies of other important trading
partners. The inflexibility of the East Asian currencies caused by the exchange rate
arrangements was a contributing factor to the crises.
After the crises forced Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia to float their
currencies, traders began searching for technical floors and policy analysts began to call for new
approaches to exchange rate management. In the aftermath, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) has been criticized, among other things, for not offering an alternative to a free float.
Regarding the East Asian currency crises, however, Stanley Fischer (1997, p.6) , Deputy
Managing Director of the IMF, stated:
As more normal conditions return, the question of the optimal exchange rate system will
be back on the agenda. There is no generally agreed answer to that question. Some
conclusions are easy: if the exchange rate is to be pegged, it is almost certainly better to
peg to a basket of currencies rather than a single currency.
It is important to recall that some of the crisis-stricken countries had a basket-peg system
in place at the time of the crises. The heavy weight attached to the U.S. dollar, however, resulted
in de facto single-currency-pegs rather than intermediate regimes. As nations continue to rely on
currency-basket-peg arrangements, the appropriate weighting of currencies comprising the
basket becomes an important research question.
Though an important and practical issue, optimally designed currency basket
arrangements have received only limited theoretical treatment in the academic literature. In
addition, these types of arrangements have not been studied in a manner that illuminates events
such as the Central European and East Asian currency crises. This is because the literature on
optimal currency weights tends to focus on the goods sector of the economy only (see Connolly
and Yousef 1982, and Edison and Vrdal 1990, as examples), or focuses on developed
economies, assuming perfect capital mobility and no currency substitution (Turnovsky 1982).
Although these models generate interesting results, their assumptions are inconsistent with the
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conditions that exist in transitional and emerging economies. Fortunately this gap in the literature
has spurred recent empirical research by Kotilainen (1995), Benassy-Quéré (1999), and Ito et al.,
(1998).
In this paper we consider the optimal design of the currency basket from a theoretical
perspective. We take the choice of exchange rate regime as predetermined. In other words, we
do not investigate the optimal regime here, rather we consider the optimal weights within a
currency basket regime.1 We then develop a small-country macroeconomic model to show that
an optimally designed basket-peg arrangement can minimize the variance in domestic consumer
prices as well as the variance of foreign reserves. Many nations, however, simply determine
currency weights based on trade relationships. The small-country macroeconomic model we
employ, highlights, in addition to the real sector, the importance of the money and bond markets
and, thus, the importance of various interest rate channels. Additionally we show that a
trade-weighted currency basket is not only suboptimal, it is at odds with increasing capital market
integration. Further our solutions illustrate that the optimal weights will evolve along with the
integration of the domestic economy into the global market for goods, services, and financial
instruments. This final conclusion provides theoretical support to the claim made by Frankel
(1999, p. 22) that exchange-rate arrangement parameters change over time, particularly “as
governments deliberately change their economic structure, for example increasing regional trade
integration...”
In Section 2 we present a small-country macroeconomic model suitable for the analysis
of a developing or emerging nation and its choice of currency basket weights. In Section 3 we
derive the optimal weights as an outcome of the minimization of a selected loss function, and the
implications of the solutions are discussed in detail. Section 4 provides some relevant points for
policymaking and a summary of our analysis.

II. A Developing Country Model
Our analysis is derived from a model of a small open economy that is linked to two large
economies through the goods, money, and bond markets. The currency of the small economy is
pegged to a basket of two currencies. Much of the research on currency baskets focuses on the
goods sector only. (See Edison and Vrdal, 1990, as an example). Turnovsky (1982), however,
considers the currency basket in the context of a more general macroeconomic model, and the
currency weights as outcomes of optimal policy-making. By assuming perfect capital mobility and
no currency substitution, Turnovskys model applies to developed economies.
We add to the macro-model based analysis of currency basket pegs by including two
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important aspects of emerging and developing economies; currency substitution and imperfect
capital substitution. Our approach is to extend Turnovsky’s model by allowing domestic bonds to
be imperfect substitutes in international bond markets. We also incorporate currency substitution,
allowing private agents to hold and transact with foreign currencies, which, in some of the
economies considered here, has been a significant concern (Sahay and Végh, 1995).
The various equations of the model are common in the literature and we draw directly
from the model of Daniels (1997) for equations representing goods, money demand, output, and
bond demand and balance of payments equations, and add to this Turnovsky’s (1982)
specification of the relationship among cross-exchange rates and exchange rate policy. Finally,
we follow Benevie’s (1983) approach to aggregating the balance of payments.

A. Model Equations
The following six equations describe the home goods, money, and bonds markets for the
small economy. These markets are linked to two large economies denoted as country 1 and
country 2. The currencies of the large economies are those represented in the currency basket.
The model equations are:
Aggregate Demand
yt =a0[rt(Etct+1-ct)]+a1(p1t+e1t-pt)+a2(p2t+e2t-pt)+0tηt; a0,1,2>0, (1)
Consumer Prices
ct=α0pt+ α1(p1t+e1t)+ α2(p2t+e2t),

α0+α1+α2=1,

(2)

g0,1,2>0,

(3)

h>0,

(4)

bft=-j0rt+j1[r1t+(Ete1t+1-e1t)]+j2[r2t+(Ete2t+1-e2t)];

j0,1,2>0,

(5)

bdt=q0rt-q1[r1t+(Ete1t+1-e1t)]-q2[r2t+(Ete2t+1-e2t)];

q0,1,2>0,

(6)

Money Demand
mt-pt=yt-g0rt-g1[r1t+(Ete1t+1-elt)]-g2[r2t+(Ete2t+1-e2t)]+ξt;
Output
yt=h(pt-Et-1pt);
Bond Demand

where the variables of countries 1 and 2 are indicated with a numbered subscript and home
variables are not, and
yt log of real output,
ct consumer price index,
pt log of home output price level,
pit log of country is home output price level; i=1,2,
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eit log of the exchange rate, defined as units of home currency to currency i;
i=1,2,
mt log of the nominal money stock,
rt

nominal interest rate,

Et+j expectations operator, conditional on information dated time t+j,
ηt home output demand disturbance, with E(ηt)=0 and E(ht 2)=s2 h ,
ξt

home money demand disturbance, with E(ξt)=0 and E(xt 2)=s2 x,

bft end-of-period stock demand for foreign bonds, denominated in a common accounting
standard,
and,
bdt end-of-period stock demand for home bonds, denominated in a common accounting
standard.
All variables are normalized around trend and the stochastic disturbances ht and xt are
assumed to be independent and uncorrelated.
Equation (1) represents the equilibrium condition for home output demand, where
demand is positively related to domestic price competitiveness and negatively related to the
domestic real interest rate. Equation (2) defines the relative consumer price index for the home
economy, where ai represents the weights in the consumption basket of domestic and foreign
goods.
Equation (3) is the demand function for real money balances of the home economy. Note
that we assume the income elasticity of money demand to be unity.2 The expected foreign
interest yields are meant to capture currency substitution channels. Increases in the interest
elasticities, g1 and g2, represent greater degrees of currency substitution.
Equation (4) is a typical price-innovation goods supply function. The supply conditions
could be conditioned on consumer prices as opposed to home output prices, adding greater
detail to the model, but would not change our general conclusions. A supply shock is not
included here because its effect it similar to a combination of a goods demand and money
demand shock which are already included.
Equations (5) and (6) are the demand functions for foreign and home bonds, where home
(foreign) bond demand depends positively on the home (foreign) yield and negatively on the
expected foreign (home) yield.
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B. Specification of Exchange Rates and Exchange Policy
The two exchange rates that the home economy faces imply a cross-rate between the
currencies of countries 1 and 2. Currency arbitrage insures that
e1t−e2t =e3t,

(7)

where e3t is the exchange rate of countries 1 and 2, defined as units of country 2’s currency per
unit of country 1’s currency. Because the home country is assumed to be a small country, the
cross-exchange rate, e3, is considered to be exogenous to the small country.
To examine the exchange rate policy rule, we consider a regime in which the domestic
currency is pegged to a two-currency basket, and where the basket is a weighted average of the
value, ε, of the home currency relative to the currency of countries 1 and 2. Therefore the policy
rule is described as
λ1e1t+λ2e2t =e;

λ1+λ2=1.

(8)

We normalize the value of basket, ε, at unity, and, therefore, the logged value of (8) is
λ1e1t+λ2e2t=0.

(9)

Because λ1 and λ2 are linearly dependent policy instruments, there is only one unique
weight as λ2 can be expressed as λ2=1−λ1. Equations (7) and (8) can be used to solve for the
exchange rates e1t and e2t in terms of the cross rate, e3t, yielding e1=λ2e3t, and e2=−λ1e3t
Given the exchange rate regime, foreign reserves are endogenous as they must adjust to
maintain the pegged basket value. Because we assume that domestic authorities are unwilling or
unable to sterilize foreign exchange transactions, changes in the money supply, mt, are
equivalent to changes in the foreign reserves component, ft, which is denominated in a common
accounting standard.3
The exchange rate e3t is determined by the interaction of countries 1 and 2. Therefore the
international linkage of these economies must be characterized in order to specify the
constraints on the cross rate. Following Turnovsky (1982) we consider these two large
economies as being characterized by perfect capital mobility. Hence, uncovered interest parity
holds. Internally, however, the relationship among interest rates and prices is given by the Fisher
relation. These two relationships are expressed as, respectively:
r2t−r1t =Ete3t+1−e3t,

(10)

r1t =ρ1+(Etp1t+1−p1t ),

(11)

r2t =ρ2+(Etp2t+1−p2t ).

(12)

and
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Equation (10) implies that the anticipated depreciation of the currency of country 2
relative to country 1 is determined by the nominal interest rate differential. Equations (11) and
(12) are the Fisher relation, in which the nominal interest rate is equal to the real interest rate, ri,
plus expected inflation. In equations (11) and (12), the real interest rate is assumed to be
constant. Equations (10) through (12) allow us to express the expected changes in the
cross-exchange rate in terms of the real interest rates and expected price changes of country 1
and country 2.
Because the home country considered here is a small country, and given that countries 1
and 2 are assumed to be large countries, the prices, interest rates, and cross-rate of countries 1
and 2 are taken as exogenous. In addition, these foreign exogenous variables are not correlated
with the exogenous shocks of the small country. They are, however, correlated with each other.
Thus, from the home country’s perspective, E(p1t)=E(p2t)=E(e3t)=0, E(p21t)=σ2 p1, E(p22t)=σ2 p2,
E(e23t)= σ2e3, E(p1te3t)=σ2p1e3, E(p2te3t)=σ2 p2e3, and E(p1tp2t)=σ2pp.

C. External Equilibrium
A final set of assumptions is necessary to describe an external equilibrium condition. For
the small nation, the current account surplus less capital outflows equals changes in official
reserves. Aggregating the balance of payments equations and ignoring interest rate effects on
trade balances [as in Benevie (1983)], the external equilibrium condition, or changes in official
reserves, ft, can be expressed as:
ft =a1(p1t+e1t−pt)+a2(p2t+e2t -pt)−(bft−bdt).

(13')

Through substitution, the condition is expressed as:
ft=Y1p1t+γ2p2t−γ3pt+γ4rt+(λ2γ1-λ1γ2)e3t,

(13)

where γ1≡(a1+q1+j1), γ2≡(a2+q2+j2), γ3≡(a1+a2), γ4≡(q0+j0). If there is no goods market integration
amongst the home country and countries 1 and 2, the parameters a1 and a2 equal 0. The more
integrated are the goods markets, the larger these parameters become, approaching infinity and
yielding purchasing power parity. Similarly, if there is no capital mobility, the parameters j0, j1, j2,
q0, q1, and q2 equal zero. If there is perfect capital mobility, these parameters approach infinity
and uncovered interest parity prevails.

D. Model Solutions
To solve the model, equations (1), (2), (4), (7), (8), and (10) through (12) are used to
derive an equilibrium condition for the goods market, equations (3), (4), and (7) through (12) an
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equilibrium condition for the money market, and equations (5) through (13) an equilibrium
condition for the balance of payments. The three equilibrium conditions can be used to solve for
the three endogenous variables, pt, rt, and ft. Solutions for these variables are proposed as
functions of four exogenous variables, p1t, p2t, ηt, and ξt:
pt =π10+π11ηt+π12ξt+π13p1t+π14p2t,

(14)

rt=π20+π21ηt+π22ξt+π23p1t+π24p2t,

(15)

ft =π30+π31ηt+π32ξt+π33p1t+π34p2tt

(16)

and,

The solutions for the πij coefficients are derived by the method of undetermined
coefficients and are provided in the appendix.

III. Policy Objectives and Optimal Instrument Settings
A. The Objective Function
To derive the optimal values for the basket weights, we must first motivate a reasonable
objective function. We assume that the objectives of the policymaker are domestic consumer
price and exchange regime stabilization. The optimal basket weights can be derived as optimal
outcomes by minimizing a loss function defined as a weighted average of the variance of
unanticipated consumer price inflation and the variances of changes in foreign exchange
reserves.4 The loss function is expressed as:
L=µ1Var(ct−Et-1ct)+µ2Var(ft);µ1+µ2=1.

(17)

In other words, the policymaker seeks to smooth domestic consumer prices, but also
desires to smooth the changes in foreign reserves that result from maintaining the exchange rate
regime, perhaps to avoid speculative attacks on the currency. We choose this loss function
because it is consistent with the stated objective of many of the transitional and emerging
economies and the recommendations of the IMF (see Klacek 1995, p. 5, and Masson, et al.,
1998). By substituting equation (2) in (17), the loss function can be expressed as:
L=µ1Var[α0(pt−Et−1pt)+α1p1t+α2p2t+(α1λ2−α2λ1)e3t]+µ2Var(ft).

(18)

Though the domestic authority is endowed with only one unique instrument, the loss
function (18) indicates that, to achieve its goals, the domestic authority seeks to minimize the
variance of domestic output price innovations, the impact of foreign price and cross-rate
variances and covariances on the domestic economy, and the variance of changes in foreign
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reserves.

B. Optimal Instrument Settings
The optimal instrument settings are determined through the unconstrained minimization
of the loss function (18). First we use the constraint on the weights as given in equation (8) to
express λ2 in terms of λ1. We then minimize (18) with respect to λ1. The solutions are:
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where the βi and ∆ identities are provided in the appendix. As has been noted in the literature, it
is possible that one of the solutions exceed unity. That is, one weight is positive and one is
negative. Though theoretically possible, we do not consider this outcome here.

C. Importance of the Cross-Exchange Rate
Considering the exogenous shocks that appear in the solutions given in (19a) and (19b),
it is apparent that the cross-exchange rate is most important. In fact, if foreign prices are not
correlated with the cross-rate, then the covariance terms do not appear in the optimal solutions
at all. This is not to say that foreign prices are not important to the domestic economy. They do
indeed impact on the domestic consumer price and foreign reserves. Rather it is that a currency
basket arrangement is managed by intervening in response to changes in the cross-rate’s
among the currencies included in the basket (see Daniels and VanHoose 1999, pp. 91-94).
Hence, only shocks involving the cross-rate are important in determining the optimal basket
weights.5
We also see that (see the solution for λ2 provided in the appendix) the sign on the
covariance terms are positive in the optimal solution for λ1 and negative in the solution for λ2. The
intuition behind this is as follows. Given that, in Equation (7) the cross-rate is defined as units of
country 2’s currency to country 1’s currency, then we would expect prices of country 2 to be
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positively correlated with the cross-rate. That is, as prices rise in country 2, ceterus paribus, the
cross-rate rises, indicating a depreciation of the country 2’s currency relative to country 1’s
currency. In a similar manner we would expect the prices of country 1 to be negatively correlated
with the cross-rate.
Viewing the solution for λ1 in (19a), σ2p1e3<0, implies that as this covariance rises, the
weight assigned to the currency of country 1, λ1, should be reduced whereas the weight assigned
to the currency of country 2, λ2, should be increased. Likewise, because σ2p2e3>0, as this
covariance rises, the weight assigned to the currency of country 1, λ1, should be increased
whereas the weight assigned to the currency of country 2, λ2, should be decreased.

D. Importance of Interest Rate Channels
Turning our attention to the βi identities, which are provided in the appendix, we see that
these identities are complex combinations of the price and interest elasticities, the degree of
indexation in the economy (h), and the weights in the consumption basket. In much of the
previous literature, the various interest rate channels were ignored, while in the Turnovsky model
they only affected the domestic economy through the demand for home output. As the more
detailed model developed here shows, the interest rate channels are much broader than this.
Hence, the impact of foreign interest rates (and therefore the cross-exchange rate) on money
and bond demand must be considered in determining the optimal basket weights. This assertion
receives additional support in the following sections.

E. Are Trade Weights or a Single-Currency Peg Optimal?
Trade weights are often suggested as the appropriate weighting scheme for a currency
basket arrangement. For example, The Economist (1997) claimed that:
Southeast Asia needs something in-between, with more exchange rate flexibility than
before, but without going all the way to a free float. At the very least, linking to a
trade-weighted basket of currencies would provide more flexibility than a dollar peg.
Contrary to these assertions, trade weights are optimal only under very restrictive
assumptions. First, trade weights, λ1=α1 and λ2=α2, are optimal only if the consumption share of
home output is zero, α0=0. Practically speaking this is not plausible. Viewing the optimal
solutions in (19a) and (19b), the only other case where trade weights are optimal are when the
identities β6 and β9 equal zero. This would require that all foreign interest elasticities of the model
equal zero. In words, a trade-weighted basket ignores foreign shocks to the money and bonds
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sectors as well as foreign interest rate shock effects on the demand for domestic output. Thus a
trade-weighted currency basket would be inconsistent with calls for reductions in capital controls.
A single-currency peg is optimal if one of the optimal basket weight solutions equals unity.
In the case of λ1, the optimal solution equals unity only if the covariance terms, σ2p1e3 and σ2p2e3,
are zero and if β15 equals zero, i.e., if α2=a2=j2=q2=g2=0. Or in other words, if all the elasticity
terms pertaining to country 2 equal zero, indicating no integration with country 2 whatsoever.

F. Increasing Goods Market, Money Market, and Bond Market Integration
Another important conclusion we can draw from the solutions is that uneven integration or
transition implies that the currency weights must change, and therefore periodic evaluation and
changes are required. For example, if, in equation (19a), β6 and α1 increase relative to β9 and α2,
then the weight on country 1’s currency rises with the variance of the cross-rate but falls with the
covariance of prices and the cross-rate. Depending on which terms are most important indicates
which direction the weights should be adjusted.
The evidence of the previous section also implies that a low level of capital market
integration, given by g1, g2, j1, j2, q1, and q2 in equations (3), (5), and (6), requires currency
weights that approximate a trade-weighted scheme. Increasing capital market integration,
however, requires an adjustment away from the trade-weights, with the appropriate adjustment
depending on the relative importance of the two large countries and the relative importance of
the various interest channels. Hence, a dynamic emerging or transitional economy must be
prepared to adjust the basket weights periodically.

IV. Policy Relevance and Conclusion
The exchange rate arrangement represents an important choice for emerging and
transitional economies as they strive to become market-driven, stable economies. A wide variety
of arrangements have emerged, ranging from currency boards, crawling pegs, exchange rate
bands, basket-currency pegs, to floating rates. The IMF has suggested that, if the exchange
value of a currency is to be pegged, it is better to peg to a basket of currencies rather than a
single currency. Nonetheless, there has been little theoretical research on the management and
optimal design of basket-peg arrangements.
In this paper we have shown that by pegging to a basket of currencies, the path of
domestic prices is still subject to external shocks, including changes in the cross-exchange rates
of the currencies in the basket arrangement. We also show, however, that an optimally designed
basket-peg arrangement can be designed to minimize the variance in domestic consumer prices
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as well as the variance of the nations foreign reserves. In contrast to the previous literature, the
small-country macroeconomic model developed here, highlights the importance of the money
and bond markets and, thus, the importance of various interest rate channels. As a result, a
trade-weighted currency basket is not only suboptimal, it is at odds with increasing capital market
integration. Likewise our model illustrates that the optimal weights will evolve along with the
integration of the domestic economy into the global market for goods and services, and financial
instruments.
In summary, the relevant policymaking guidelines that emerge from our model is that:
1. Contrary to arguments offered by the media and the IMF, a trade-weighted basket is not
likely to be optimal.
2. A through understanding of the macroeconomy is needed, particularly estimates of
foreign price, interest, and exchange rate elasticities, for the determinations of optimal
weights.
3. Exogenous cross-exchange-rates are an important consideration in the management of a
basket-peg arrangement. For practical purposes, therefore, a basket that includes a small
number of currencies is preferred.
4. Currency weights should be reviewed on a regular time schedule and adjustments made
when deemed necessary.
Though the following do not flow from the results of our analysis here, we also suggest
that:
5. The currency composition, and optimally determined currency weights, and intervention
bands should be announced as should the level of foreign currency reserves and
intervention activities. Any adjustments made to weights should be announced as should
the rational for their change so that market participants perceive the changes and the
new weights and intervention bands to be credible.
The first is consistent with the recommendations found in the target zone literature, which
shows that a credible band influences expectations and may have a stabilizing effect on the
exchange rate (see Girardin and Marimoutou, 1997, for a summary). The remainder is consistent
with the recommendations of the IMF who claim that crises, such as that experienced by Mexico,
are worsened by the “poor quality to information supplied to both the official sector (including the
IMF) and the markets” (Fischer, 1997, p. 8), and by Frankel (1999, p. 6) who states that
“governments can reclaim confidence only by proclaiming policies that are so simple and so
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transparent that investors can verify instantly that the government is in fact doing what it claims
to be doing.”

Notes
1. Savvides (1993) suggests that the decision to peg the currency or to allow it to be
flexible, and whether to peg to a single currency or a basket of currencies are jointly
determined choices.
2. This simplifying assumption has no impact on the general results of interest to us.
3. If foreign exchange intervention actions can be partially or fully sterilized, then the
domestic money supply does not necessarily move one-to-one with changes in foreign
reserves. Sterilization, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
4. It can ppe shown that minimization of the variance of consumer prices is equivalent to
minimizing the real exchange rate.
5. Because Turnovsky (1982) uses various identities to substitute out the cross-rate, the
importance of the cross-rate is unseen.
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Mathematical Appendix
Model Solutions
pt =π10+π11ηt+π12ξt+π13p1t+π14p2t+π15e3t
rt =π20+π21ηt+p22ξt+π23p1t+π24p2t+π25e3t
ft =p30+p31ηt+π32ξt+π33p1t+π34p2t+π35e3t
Π11=β2∆−1

Π12=−a0∆−1

Π13=β6∆−1

Π14=β9∆−1

Π15 =(β6λ2−β9λ1)}∆−1
Π21=β3∆−1

Π22=β1∆−1

Π23=β7∆−1

Π24=β10∆−1

Π25 =(β7λ2−β10λ1)}∆−1
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Π31=β4∆−1

Π32=β5∆−1

Π33=β8∆−1

Π34=β11∆−1

Π35=(β8λ2−β11λ1)∆−1
Π10=a0[(g1−j1−q1)ρ1+(g2−j2−q2)ρ2][(a1+a2)(g0+j0)+q0)+a0(1+a1+a2)]−1
Π20=−(a1+a2)[(g1−j1−q1)ρ1+(g2−j2−q2)ρ2][(α1+α2)(γ0+j0)+q0)+a0(1+a1+a2)]−1
Π30=−{[(a1+a2)g0+a0][(g1−j1−q1)ρ1
+(g2−j2−q2)ρ2]+(a1+a2)(a0+j0+q0)(g1r1+g2r2)}[(a1+a2)(g0+j0+q0)+
a0(1+a1+a2)]−1
∆≡β1β2+a0β3

Identities
β1≡[(a1+a2)+(h+a0α0)]

β2≡(g0+j0+q0)

β3≡[(1+h)+(a1+a2)]

β4≡[(1+h)(j0+q0)−g0(a1+a2)]

β5≡β1(j0+q0)+a0(a1+a2)

β6≡(a1−a0α1)β2+a0(a1+j1+q1−g1)

β7≡(a1−a0a1)β3−β1β12
β8≡β1[g0(a1+j1+q1)+g1(j0+q0)]+a0[(1+h)(a1+j1+q1)+g1(a1+a2)]+(a1−a0a1)β4
β9≡(a2−a0a2)β2+a0β13

β10≡(a2−a0α2)β3−β1β13

β11≡β1[g0(a2+j2+q2)+g2(j0+q0)]+a0[(1+h)(a2+j2+q2)+g2(a1+a2)]+(a2−a0a2)β4

Daniels, Toumanoff, von der Ruhr 15

Appendix
Table 1: IMF Member Nations Pegging or Managing Against a Currency Basket
Country
Bangaladesh

Classification
Conventional
Peg
Conventional
Peg
Conventional
Peg
Crawling Bend

Currency
taka

Conventional
Peg

dollar

Hungary

Crawling Band

forint

Iceland

Exchange Rate
Band

krna

Israel

Crawling Band

sheqel

Kuwait

Conventional
Peg

dinar

Latvia

Conventional
Peg
Exchange Rate
Band

lats

Basket
Weighted basket comprised of the currencies of
Bangaladeshs major trading partners.
Weighted basket comprised of the SDR and the
South African rand.
Weighted basket comprised of the currencies of
Burundis main trading partners.
Reference rate for band is a weighted basket
consisting of the US dollar, the euro, and the
Japanese yen.
Weighted basket of currencies comprised of the
Australian dollar, the Japanese yen, the New
Zeland dollar, the euro, and the US dollar.
Reference rate for band is a weighted basket
comprised of the euro and the US dollar.
Reference rate for band is a weighted basket
comprised of the Canadian dollar, Danish krona,
Norwegian krone, UK pound, Swedish krona,
Swiss franc, and the US dollar.
Reference rate for band is a weighted basket
comprised of the euro, UK pound, Japanese
yen, and the US dollar.
Weighted basket of currencies comprised of the
currencies of Kuwaits trade and financial
partners.
SDR

dinar

SDR

Conventional
Peg
Conventional
Peg
Conventional
Peg
Crawling Band

rufiyaa

Weighted basket of currencies comprised of
Maldives trade partners.
Weighted basket of currencies comprised of the
UK pound, the US dollar, and the euro.
SDR

Exchange Rate
Band
Conventional
Peg

riyal

Exchange Rate
Band

riyal

Botswana
Burundi
Chile

Figi

Socialist
Peoples
Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya
Maldives
Malta
Myanmar
Poland
Qatar
Samoa

Saudi Arabia

pula
franc
peso

lira
kyat
zloty

tala
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Central rate is a weighted basket of currencies
comprised of the euro and the US dollar.
SDR
Central rate is a weighted basket of currencies
comprised of the currencies of Samoas trade
partners.
SDR

Table 1 (continued)
Country
Seychelles

Classification
Conventional
Peg

Currency
rupee

Slovak
Republic
Solomon
Islands

Managed float

koruna

Conventional
Peg

dollar

Conventional
Peg

paanga

Exchange Rate
Band
Conventional
Peg

dirham

Tonga

United Arab
Emirates
Vanuatu

vatu

Basket
Weighted basket comprised of the US dollar, UK
pound, French franc, South African rand,
Singapore dollar, German mark, Italian lira, and
the Japanese yen.
Managed against a basket comprised of the
German mark and US dollar
Central rate is a weighted basket of currencies
comprised of the currencies of the Solomon
Islands trade partners.
Weighted basket of currencies comprised of the
US dollar, the Australian dollar, and the New
Zealand dollar.
SDR

Central rate is a weighted basket of currencies
comprised of the currencies of Vanuatus trade
partners.
Source: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, 1999.
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